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Edward 'V. Aquillard: 
ESTABUSHMENT CLAUSE 
VIOLATED BY STATUTE 
REQUIRING SCHOOL'S 
BALANCED TREATMENT OF 
EVOLUTION AND CREATION 
SCIENCE 
In Edwards 'V. Aquillard, __ U.S. __ , 
107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987), the Supreme Court 
of the United States held the Louisiana Bal-
anced Treatment Act facially invalid 
because it violated the Establishment 
Clause of the first amendment. The Court 
found that the Act, as it applied to elemen-
tary and secondary public schools, sought 
to employ the symbolic and financial sup-
port of government to achieve a religious 
purpose. 
The Plaintiffs, Louisiana teachers and 
parents of public school students, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Act in 
federal district court. The district court 
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for summa-
ry judgment, holding that no secular pur-
pose for the Act was present. The court of 
appeals affirmed. 
The Balanced Treatment Act did not 
require the teaching of either evolution or 
creation-science. However, it did forbid 
the teaching of either without balanced 
treatment of the other. The theories of 
evolution and creation-science were statu-
torily defined as "the scientific evidences 
for [creation or evolution] and inferences 
for those scientific evidences." La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1-7 (West 1982). 
The Court has applied the three prong 
Lemon test in the past to determine the 
constitutionality of Establishment Clause 
cases. First, the law must have a secular leg-
islative purpose. Second, the statute's pri-
mary effect must neither advance nor 
inhibit religion and third, the statute must 
not result in an excessive entanglement of 
government with religion. Lemon 'V. Kurt-
zman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
In the instant case, because the Court 
found that the Act had no secular purpose, 
"no consideration of the second or third 
criteria is necessary." Wallace 'V. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38,56 (1985). The purpose prong 
of the Lemon test considers whether the 
government's actual purpose is to endorse 
or disapprove of religion. Lynch 'V. Donnel-
ly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
As to the determinative issue of secular 
purpose, the main point of disagreement 
between the majority and the dissent was 
whether the Act's stated purpose of "pro-
tecting academic freedom" was sufficiently 
secular (dissent) or a cover-up of a religious 
preference (majority). To support their 
decisions, both the majority and dissent 
appealed to the statutory terms, judicial 
and legislative history, and the general 
history and understanding of the two theo-
ries. 
In its analysis, the Court first found that 
academic freedom was not advanced by 
Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act_ Con-
versely, the purpose was to "discredit evo-
lution by counter-balancing its teaching at 
every turn with the teaching of creation-
science." Edward 'V. Aquillard, 107 S. Ct. 
2573, 2580. The Act provided schoolteach-
ers with no more authority or flexibility 
than what they already possessed. The 
Court also saw the Act as having a discrim-
inatory preference for the teaching of 
creation-science because curriculum 
guides, research services, and protection 
against discrimination were supplied for it 
but not for evolution-science. 
Opining for the dissent, Justice Scalia 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took 
issue with the Court's evaluation of "aca-
demic freedom" because it was contrary to 
the terms of the statute. In their view, the 
legislative history clearly showed that the 
"academic freedom" was intended for the 
students to be free from indoctrination, 
not the teacher's freedom to teach what 
they want. 
The dissent approached the majority's 
argument of discrimination in favor of 
creation-science by focusing on the present 
status of the science curriculum in public 
schools. Creation-science asserted the dis-
sent, is being discriminated, misrepre-
sented, and censored in public schools in 
favor of evolution. Id. at 2602. The Act's 
purpose was to reasonably redress this dis-
crimination by compensating for the 
unavailability of texts on creation-science 
for class use and allowing creation-
scientists to write them. Simply, the dis-
sent argued, protection for evolutionists 
from discrimination is not needed. 
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Next, the Court found that the legisla-
tive and historical interpretation of 
creation-science advanced a particular re-
ligious doctrine. In Epperson 'V. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court noted con-
temporaneous and historical antagonisms 
and connections between the teachings of 
certain religious denominations and the 
teaching of evolution. Witnesses at the leg-
islative hearings in the instant case testified 
that a creator was responsible for the 
universe and everything in it. The sponsor-
ing senator stated that "evolution advances 
religions contrary to my own." Edwards, 
107 S. Ct. at 2582. 
From this evidence, the majority con-
cluded that the Act's primary purpose was 
to provide an advantage to a particular re-
ligious doctrine that rejects evolution and 
holds to the creation of humankind by a 
divine creator. To violate the Establish-
ment Clause the statute must either pro-
mote a particular religious doctrine, here, 
the Judeo-Christian belief in creation, or 
prohibit a theory deemed antagonistic to a 
particular doctrine, here, evolution. See 
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106-7. 
The dissent asserted that the majority 
disregarded the stated purpose of the stat-
ute and determined what they believed to 
have motivated the legislature. Creation-
science is a term of art. Louisiana law, con-
tinued the dissent, requires it to be 
interpreted according to the art or profes-
sion to which it refers. La. Civ. Code Ann. 
art. 15 (West 1952). The majority had 
interpreted "creation-science" according 
to its historical affiliations. The dissent 
believed that "creation-science" should be 
defined according to the statutory defini-
tion and legislative history, and therefore, 
could easily be taught without reference to 
religion. 
Additionally, the dissent asserted that 
legislators could vote based on their re-
ligious convictions and stay within the 
confines of the first amendment. To sup-
port this proposition, the dissent relied on 
Harris 'V. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), 
where Sunday blue laws were upheld even 
though they happened to harmonize with 
the tenets of some religions. 
An inconsistency in the Court's opinion 
was shown by the dissent because without 
the Balanced Treatment Act the Court was 
violating the Establishment Clause by al-
lowing evolution-science to be taught free-
ly. The Court has referred to secular 
humanism as a religion with evolution as 
a central tenant. Torcaso 'V. Watkins, 367 
U.S. 488 (1961). Therefore, the dissent 
concluded, creation-science is being dis-
criminated against and religion with evolu-
tion is being promoted. The Balanced 
Treatment Act was designed to redress 
that for the benefit of the students. 
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Justice Powell joined by Justice O'Con-
ner (concurring) concluded that there were 
historical associations of creation-science 
with the religious belief in the creation of 
the universe by a divine God as described 
in the Bible. These associations, according 
to Justice Powell, were enough to overricj.e 
the fact that the statute did not explicitly 
refer to a religious purpose. 
The Court did leave the door open for 
religious oriented information and 
creation-science to be used in public 
schools; but the purpose must not advance 
a particular religious belief. 
Edwards v. Aquillard follows closely the 
trend of Supreme Court decisions dealing 
with state statutes addressing religion in 
public schools. The Establishment Clause 
is being relied upon in the Court's 
involvement in state educational law, an 
area in which the state and local govern-
ments have a large interest. In recent years 
the Court has invalidated a school dis-
trict's use of public school teachers in re-
ligious schools. Grand Rapids School 
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and 
the hanging of a copy of the Ten Com-
mandments on a public school wall. Stone 
v. Gragam, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). In these 
two cases the Court found no secular pur-
pose. Edwards also illustrates that in deter-
mining the presence of secular purpose the 
Court will go beyond the definitions in 
the statute to find the motives of the legis-
lature. This is one reason why Justice Sca-
lia has called for a re-evaluation of the 
Lemon secular purpose test. 
-David G. Banister 
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Lee v. Wheeler: RECOVERY FOR 
NEGUGENCEOFPHANTOM 
DRIVER UNDER UNINSURED 
MOTORIST PROVISIONS 
On a question certified by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held in Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 
233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987) that under an 
automobile insurance policy covering 
Maryland insureds, an uninsured motorist 
provision limiting coverage to situations in 
which there is physical contact between 
the insureds' vehicle and the phantom 
vehicle is unenforceable as against public 
policy under Maryland law. This case 
expanded a similar ruling in State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. 
Fund, 227 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1976) by 
making such provisions unenforceable for 
accidents happening outside, as well as 
inside, the State of Maryland. 
Ark and Olivia Lee were residents of 
Maryland whose automobile was titled 
and registered in Maryland. The original 
insurance policy and all renewals were 
addressed and mailed to the Lees' 
Maryland residence and all premiums were 
paid from the same residence. While the 
Lees were operating their vehicle in the 
District of Columbia, a vehicle operated 
by Marlene Wheeler swerved to avoid an 
unidentified (phantom) vehicle that sud-
denly entered her lane of traffic. In the 
process, Wheeler struck the Lees' vehicle 
head-on. 
The Lees brought an action against 
Wheeler in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia invok-
ing diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1332 (1982). The Lees also joined their 
insurer, Pennsylvania General Insurance 
Company (Pennsylvania General), seeking 
coverage under the policy's uninsured 
motorist provisions for the damages sus-
tained as a result of the phantom's negli-
gence. 
The Lees' claim against Pennsylvania 
General was dismissed because the district 
judge found that the Lees' insurance policy 
expressly required physical contact with 
the phantom vehicle in order for the unin-
sured motorist coverage provisions to ap-
ply and that provision was enforceable 
under District of Columbia law. The Lees 
appealed from the order granting the 
motion to dismiss. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit found 
that Maryland law applied but found no 
pertinent Maryland cases to serve as a 
guide in making a decision. Under Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 12-601 
(1984), they certified the following ques-
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